The effects of borrowing rates on intra-firm disequilibria between equity prices and CDS premiums – evidence from dynamic panel analysis. by Brown, Robert J
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 2
2016
The effects of borrowing rates on intra-firm
disequilibria between equity prices and CDS
premiums – evidence from dynamic panel analysis.
Robert J. Brown
University of Warwick, robjdbrown@yahoo.co.uk
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Brown, Robert J. (2016) "The effects of borrowing rates on intra-firm disequilibria between equity prices and CDS
premiums – evidence from dynamic panel analysis.," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/2
The effects of borrowing rates on intra-firm disequilibria between equity
prices and CDS premiums – evidence from dynamic panel analysis.
Abstract
Cointegration techniques are used to estimate the long run equilibrium relationship between a firm’s CDS
premium and its equity price, for a panel of large-cap US firms. From these results, the estimated
disequilibrium in daily CDS premiums, with respect to equity prices, is constructed. Dynamic panel methods
are employed to show the importance of lagged changes in libor rates as determinants of the estimated
disequilibrium. Evidence is found that the extent to which the markets deviate from equilibrium will increase
as one-month libor rates rise, but, counter-intuitively, will decrease (return towards equilibrium) as longer
term libor rates rise.
Keywords
arbitrage, libor, panel data, cointegration, arrellano-bond, efficient markets, capital structure, cds, derivatives,
equity
Cover Page Footnote
1 I am exceedingly grateful to Prof. Jeremy Smith for his invaluable guidance, feedback and support
throughout my research.
This article is available in Undergraduate Economic Review: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/2
 Introduction 
 
Investors in corporate credit markets face numerous risks when securities are 
purchased and held. These risks arise from myriad sources including changes in the 
liquidity of securities, adverse exchange rate movements and, perhaps most crucially, 
credit or default risk. In the context of corporate bonds, credit risk can be concisely 
summarised as the risk borne by the investor that the obligor will default on some or 
all of the coupon or principle payments due as per the terms of the bond.  
 
The credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative contract allowing the investor to 
transfer some or all of the credit risk arising from exposures within their portfolio to 
the CDS issuer. These derivatives bear some similarity to insurance contracts1: the 
buyer pays the issuer a periodic premium (denominated in basis points2 on the amount 
to be insured against default (the notional)), and, in return, receives compensation 
equal to the notional in the event of default. The credit risk is therefore transferred 
from the bondholder to the CDS issuer.   
 
CDS contracts have a range of uses, ranging from risk management to speculation, 
and are traded within a large and liquid segment of the derivatives market. The 
origination of the CDS contract is widely attributed to JP Morgan employees working 
in the late 1990s, and by the turn of the millennium the global market was estimated 
at c.$300bn3. The early 2000’s saw near exponential expansion in the use of CDS, and 
by 2007 the global market contracts had swelled to over $62tn, according to statistics 
gathered by ISDA. The financial crisis initiated the thus-far continuous decline in the 
scale of the global CDS market, which today stands at just over $16tn, according to 
the Bank for International Settlements.  
 
This paper will examine the link between the CDS premiums payable to protect an 
exposure to a specific obligor’s bonds and the price of that obligor’s equity. It will 
                                                        
1 The functioning of a CDS contract does not precisely equate to that of insurance agreements. 
For instance, unlike insurance, the seller of default protection is not required to post capital 
reserves against the CDS contracts issued, nor is the buyer of a contract required to hold the 
reference security. These aspects have led to widespread use of CDSs as speculative instruments, 
especially before the 2008 global crisis. 
2 Where 1 basis point equals 1/100th of a per cent.  
3 Tett, Gillian. “The Dream Machine: Invention of Credit Derivatives". Financial Times. March 24, 
2006. Retrieved March 17, 2009. 
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 demonstrate an equilibrium relationship between these two prices, and will examine 
the role played by changes in libor rates in determining the extent to which their ratio 
deviates from its equilibrium level.  
 
The expectation that the CDS and equity markets integrate derives from a strong 
theoretical basis. The crucial determinant of a CDSs’ premium is the expected 
probability of the obligor’s default on some stipulation of the reference bond. Holding 
other premium determinants (such as expected recovery rates) constant, an increase in 
the perceived probability of default will produce an increase in the CDS premium – 
probability of default and CDS premiums will positively co-move, such that the latter 
reflects the expectation of the former.  
 
CDS pricing models such as those proposed by Duffie (1999) and Hull and White 
(2000) offer a direct link between the premium of a CDS contract and the yield of the 
reference bond. Given the assumption of a term structure that is homogenous for the 
credit of all issuers, the yield of a bond above the risk-free rate4  - the asset swap 
spread – reflects the credit risk pertaining to that bond. From this conclusion they 
argue that CDS premiums should equal to the asset swap spread in equilibrium, due to 
the actions of arbitrageurs. If a CDS premium is beneath the relevant bond’s asset 
swap spread, an arbitrageur may borrow at libor and use this borrowing to purchase 
both the bond and a CDS contract to cover the bond’s notional value, allowing for 
risk-free profit. Hence, arbitrage activity serves to adjust asset swap spreads and CDS 
premiums such that no risk-free profit may be made through speculation in the long 
run, i.e. when the two equate.  
 
The link between equity prices and the issuing entity’s credit risk is also well 
established in theoretical literature. Most notably, Merton (1974) proposes a model 
where a firm’s liabilities are considered as call options on its assets. He derives a 
valuation of a corporate liability, which prices it as a function of probability of 
default, price volatility and the firm’s leverage ratio. This approach can be 
generalized to both debt and equity-based liabilities, allowing the prices of both to be 
written as negative functions of their obligor’s probability of default.  
                                                        
4 Taken to be libor in Duffie (1999) and US Treasury yields in Hull and White (2000) 
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 Considering a simple definition of a bond’s periodic yield as 𝑐 𝑃𝑡⁄ , where P and C are 
the price and coupon respectively, Merton establishes that the yield of a bond and the 
probability of default relate positively. Given that equity prices can also be expressed 
as a negative function of the probability of default, a negative relation exists between 
equity prices and bond yields for a given obligor. Given the theoretical equality of 
CDS premiums and asset swap spreads outlined above, and under the assumption of 
universal term structure homogeneity, a negative relation will therefore exist between 
CDS premiums and equity prices5. The essential nature of the link between CDSs and 
equities can be restated through simply considering that both equity prices and CDS 
premiums reflect sentiment about the future prospects of the issuer. Hence we should 
expect CDS premiums and equity prices to relate both directly and via the 
intermediary of the yield on the issuer’s bonds.  
 
Of course, in practice, short-term deviations of either security from its equilibrium 
price, relative to the other, are observed, implying arbitrage opportunities between the 
CDS and bond market, and the bond and equities market. This empirical observation 
does not undermine the hypothesis that, over longer durations, CDS and equity prices 
should exist in equilibrium, both with each other and with the yield of the reference 
bond.  
 
Potential explanations for why deviations from the equilibrium relationship may exist 
in the short run are numerous. Basak and Croitoru (2000) argue that deviations from 
equilibrium prices are an implied consequence of the heterogeneity of investor 
preferences and opinions.  Longstaff and Liu (2004) argue that arbitrageurs constrain 
the capital allocated to investment within each market, limiting their ability to restore 
credit and derivative markets, or credit and equity markets, to equilibrium even in the 
long run.  
 
The importance of the costs associated with arbitrage trades acting as a barrier to 
equilibrating activity has been highlighted by several authors. Despite the fact that 
                                                        
5 This should hold true even under imperfect information – the precise probability of default is 
ultimately unknowable, and hence securities’ prices derive from the markets’ estimation of this 
unknowable probability. CDS premiums and equity prices would still be expected to relate even if the 
distance between investors’ expectations of the probability of default differs widely from the true 
probability.  
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 equilibrium should prevail even given imperfect information, Merton (1987) argues 
that the costs of acquiring the information necessary for arbitrage trades impedes the 
convergence of credit and equity markets to the equilibrium. Given the variability of 
mispricing opportunities and their short-term duration, costs of obtaining the data 
necessary to detect a potential equilibrating trade may render the trade unprofitable. 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) point out that individual investors will rarely have 
sufficient capital to single-handedly restore equilibrium, and hence a restoration of 
securities’ prices to their equilibrium level will require the coordination of numerous 
investors, exacerbating the informational difficulties discussed by Merton. These and 
further potential reasons for the persistence of disequilibria are discussed extensively 
in Kapadia and Pu (2012). 
 
A key barrier to equilibrating activity, and the central focus of this paper, is the 
availability and ease of the funding requisite to execute the necessary trades. Attari et 
al. (2005) and others discuss the central importance of trade costs as a determinant of 
arbitrage activity – intuitively, if the margin costs faced by the arbitrageur are 
sufficient to render the exploitation of a disequilibrium unprofitable, the 
disequilibrium may persist for longer than it would if arbitrageurs could use margin 
for a lesser cost. Linked to this is the condition that exploitation of the disequilibrium 
detected by the arbitrageur must yield higher returns than other opportunities open to 
them if arbitrage activity is to occur – in other words, arbitrage should not constitute 
an opportunity-cost versus other potential trades the trader may execute, including 
lending at libor. For this reason, rises in libor not only have the potential to impede 
adjustment to equilibrium, but to actively move premiums and prices away from their 
equilibrium levels.  
 
This study considers the significance of changes in libor rates of different durations in 
determining the extent of the disequilibrium between equity prices and CDS 
premiums within a panel of large-cap US firms.  
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 Literature Review 
 
The existing body of literature concerning the relationships between the equity and 
CDS, equity and credit and credit and CDS markets is extensive, and a wide variety of 
approaches have been employed to study the equilibrium relationships, deviations 
from them and adjustment back towards them.  
 
In a recent paper, Kim and Zhang (2014) discuss the residual basis (the portion of the 
difference between CDS premiums and bond yields not explicable by a variety of risk 
factors) as a measure of mispricing between the markets for the two securities, and 
present evidence that the magnitude of the residual basis is a significant predictor of 
future short term convergence between bond yields and CDS premiums – the higher 
the residual basis, the faster the expected return towards equilibrium. The non-
residual basis, the portion of the difference between CDS premiums and bond yields 
explicable through consideration of known risk factors, is also found to significantly 
predict future bond yields.  
 
Foley-Fisher (2010) examines the relationship between the CDS premiums for 
European government bonds and said bonds’ spread over German Bunds. He finds 
inexplicable and sizeable (30-40 bps) positive movements in CDS premiums during 
the financial crisis, occurring in differing countries at different times. A strong 
association is detected between violations of the no-arbitrage condition and 
comparatively small divergences of investor sentiment, which leads the author to 
argue that heterogeneous beliefs may have a greater role in explaining this, and other 
arbitrage phenomena, than previously thought. 
     
The interrelation of equity and credit markets is also discussed extensively within the 
existing body of literature. In a study of intraday stock and bond returns for the bonds 
and equities of 439 corporations, Downing et al (2007) present evidence of lead-lag 
relationships between equity and bond markets. They find that the returns of non-
investment-grade bonds are predicted by equity returns, whereas a more significant 
predictor of the returns of investment-grade bonds is the interest rate. This is due to 
the fact that investment grade obligors are typically more consistent in their 
profitability, and so bond yields are not so heavily affected by cash flow news. They 
5
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 present the lead-lag structure uncovered as evidence of the informational inefficiency 
of the bond market relative to the equity market – a further reason why disequilibria 
may exist between the two.  
 
Fanga and Lim (2004) present further evidence of integration between credit and 
equity markets. Using a multivariate GARCH model, they use the conditional 
variance within each market as a proxy for volatility and find evidence of inter-market 
spillovers between equity and bond markets in the US and Australia. They also find 
evidence of volatility transmission from the US stock market to the Australian bond 
market. This evidence of inter-market and international volatility transmission adds 
further to the empirical case for supposing that bond and equity markets integrate. 
Further evidence of spillover effects is documented by Jacoby et al. (2009), who 
examine the spillover effects of liquidity shocks between CDS, corporate bond and 
equity markets using principle component analysis and vector autoregression 
methods. They find evidence spillover effects for liquidity shocks between equity and 
CDS markets but, counter intuitively, not between CDS and bond markets.  
 
A number of studies have sought to analyse the integration of CDS and equity 
markets directly. In a study of the relationship between the European iTraxx CDS 
index and major European equity indices, Bystrom (2005) finds significant correlation 
between iTraxx CDS premium changes and changes in stock returns. CDS premiums 
increase as stock prices fall, and stock prices fall as premiums rise. Evidence is 
presented of CDS premiums being led by equity prices, lending further support to the 
hypothesis that the CDS market is informationally inefficient relative to equity 
markets. Bystrom also provides evidence that the volatility of equity returns is 
significantly positively linked with the level of CDS premiums.  
 
Da Silva et al. (2013) employ copula methods 6  to test for associations in the 
performance of European banking stocks and CDS markets between 2007 and 2012 in 
order to test dependence structures between the two markets in periods of financial 
distress. They find evidence of autoregressive interdependence between the two 
                                                        
6 The term copula refers to a multivariate probability distribution in which the marginal probability of 
each of the random variables modelled is equal. Copula methods are used to model dependence 
structures between stochastic variables.  
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 markets but, contrary to the conclusions implied by Merton (1974), they find no 
support for the hypothesis that the co-dependence of equity prices and CDS premiums 
intensifies during periods of financial turbulence.  
 
In a study of similar spirit to this one, Esen et al. (2015) test for cointegrating 
relationships between aggregated CDS premiums and national equity markets using a 
panel of 13 G20 countries, finding evidence of cointegrating, negative relationships in 
7 of them. Their findings are consistent with those of Chan et al. (2009), who present 
evidence of inter-market cointegration in five out of seven Asian economies. Esen et 
al. additionally conclude that the direction of the dependence relationship flows from 
equity markets to CDS markets, providing further evidence that equity markets, of the 
three considered by this study (equity, credit and CDS) are most informationally 
efficient.  
 
Their evidence is in accord with the findings of Fung et al. (2008), who examine 
market-wide relationships between US equities and CDS prices over a six-year 
period. They find that the stock market appears to lead both investment grade and 
sub-investment grade CDS markets, and detect strong feedback effects from sub-
investment grade CDS markets back towards equity markets. Of the two, the 
investment grade CDS market is more distantly related to equity market movements.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two principle ways. Firstly, a large 
panel of diverse firms is employed to test the hypothesis that funding costs, proxied 
by libor, have no effect on the scale of the disequilibrium between a specific firm’s 
equity prices and CDS premiums. With several exceptions, studies on linkages 
between equity and CDS markets have largely considered the two at the national or 
index level – this study will consider integration of CDS premiums and equity prices 
at the level of the individual firm, using conventional panel methods to account for 
unobserved firm-specific factors. Secondly, this study’s approach of deriving 
estimates for pricing discrepancies, and proceeding to consider causal relations using 
said estimates, is unique, to the author’s knowledge.  
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 Data 
 
 
Data was gathered from a variety of sources. Data pertaining to specific firms’ equity 
prices and CDS premiums was drawn from the Reuters Eikon database, with some 
other firm specific factors (such as probability of default) and certain macroeconomic 
indicators (such as credit and equity market stress indices) being drawn from 
Bloomberg for use as controls. Data on libor rates, US govt. and AAA bond yields 
was sourced from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis’ database. Summary statistics for 
dependent, independent and control variables can be viewed in table 1 of the 
appendix.  
 
This study employs a panel covering 250 firms, all listed on the S&P 500, for 
approximately 250 days. The observation period runs from September 2014 to 
September 2015, excluding weekends and public holidays. Data was sampled daily, 
yielding approximately 62,000 firm-day observations, for to highly liquid securities 
relating to well known, large-cap firms. Of this original sample, evidence was found 
of a cointegrating relationship between the natural logarithm of CDS premiums and 
the natural logarithm of equity prices for 112 firms. The research question of this 
study, the effects of changes in libor rates on CDS-equity market disequilibrium, 
presupposes that an equilibrium relationship exists between the two – hence 
subsequent models were estimated on the subsample of firms within the panel for 
which a cointegrating relationship could be found. Firms with no cointegrating 
relationship were not analysed further.  
 
The study proceeded in two stages, the first of which estimated cointegrating 
relationships between equity prices and CDS premiums, and the second of which 
sought to explain the extent of the disequilibrium between the two assets’ prices. The 
dependent variable for the first stage in which cointegrating relationships were 
estimated was the natural logarithm of the CDS premium price, measured in basis 
points. Unit root tests of the form proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002)7 on both 
of the lncdscloseprice and lnequitycloseprice series for cointegrating firms generated 
p-values of 0.000 and 0.214 respectively, and further tests, of the form proposed by 
                                                        
7 The null hypothesis of the Im-Pesaran-Shin test is that all panels contain unit roots, vs. the alternative 
that some are stationary. The null of Hadri’s test is that all panels are stationary, vs. the alternative that 
some are unit root.  
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 Hadri (2000) generated p-values of 0.000 for both series. From these tests, we can 
conclude that all lnequitycloseprice series within the panel appear to contain a unit 
root, whereas a non-zero fraction of lncdscloseprice series appears to contain a unit 
root. Hence, cointegration is expected in some, but not all, panels. The results of these 
tests can be seen in table 2 of the appendix.  
 
The dependent variable for the second stage of the study are the exponents of 
residuals from the first stage of the study, equivalent to the discrepancy in CDS prices 
implied by the difference between the observed CDS premium and the premium 
predicted by the cointegrating relationship with equity prices. The value of this 
disequilibrium is measured in basis points, a disequilibrium of -157 indicating that the 
CDS contract was under-priced relative to the premium implied by equity close prices 
by 1.57% of the notional per payment period. As these values are deviations from the 
estimated cointegrating relationship, they are mean-zero and stationary by 
construction.   
 
Libor rates are sampled daily for borrowings of three durations – one, three and 
twelve months. The results of an Im, Pesaran and Shin unit root test provided strong 
evidence of the non-stationarity of these series, and so the first differences of libor 
rates were included as independent variables in the final model, to estimate their 
effect on the disequilibrium.  
 
The results for stationarity tests on all independent variables employed in the final 
model are provided in table 3 of the appendix. Where variables were non-stationary, 
their difference was included in the final equation, and the level excluded. 
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 Methodology 
 
The existence of a cointegrating relationship between the natural logarithms of CDS 
premiums and lagged equity prices was tested across the panel using the methodology 
proposed by Westerlund (2007).  Unlike alternative tests such as those of Pedroni 
(2004), which evaluate residual stationarity, Westerlund’s test focuses on the 
significance of the hypothesized error correction term – a distinction that grants it 
favourable size and power properties relative to residual-based tests.  
 
The existence of a significant error correction term is necessary and sufficient 
evidence for cointegration within the panel, and this implies that the cointegrating 
series are both I(1), at least within panels where a significant error correction term is 
detected. Nevertheless, before proceeding with formal cointegration tests, CDS 
premium and equity price time series were first tested for stationarity using the tests 
proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin and Hadri. From these tests, it is concluded that 
both equity prices and CDS prices are unit root for a non-zero fraction of firms. 
Results of this test can be seen in table 2 of the appendix.  
 
For the purposes of Westerlund’s cointegration tests, the data is assumed to arise from 
a generation process of the form; 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖
′𝑑𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇}     ,     𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁} 
 
Where T and N represent the number of time periods and panels respectively, and 𝜌 
and q represent lag and lead orders, which are permitted to vary across individuals. 𝑑𝑡 
is a vector of deterministic terms, which can be empty or include one or both of a 
constant and trend, and 𝑥 is a vector of controls. For simplicity, we model the vector 𝑥 
as a pure random walk, such that ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are independent. We further assume 
10
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 that values of 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are independently and identically distributed across all periods in all 
panels8. The model can be re-written as; 
 
1)         ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖
′𝑑𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + (−𝜙𝑖𝛽𝑖
′)𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
 
Thus the parameter 𝜙𝑖 determines the speed of the systematic error correction after a 
shock. Hence the (non)existence of an error-correcting process, and therefore of a 
cointegrating relationship between the dependent and independent variables, can be 
assessed by testing: 
 
𝐻0: 𝜙𝑖 = 0 ;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁. 
 
Westerlund calculates four distinct tests of two categories: group tests and panel tests. 
The specification of the alternative hypothesis depends on the category of test 
selected: the panel tests assume 𝜙𝑖 = ?̅? is equal for all firms, whereas the group tests 
do not impose this restriction, allowing 𝜙𝑖  to vary by firm. Their respective 
alternative hypotheses are therefore: 
 
𝐻𝐴
𝑃: 𝜙𝑖 < 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖 
𝐻𝐴
𝐺: 𝜙𝑖 < 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ≥ 1 𝑖 
 
To construct the group tests, model 1 is estimated for each firm, yielding; 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖′̂𝑑𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖?̂?
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
 
Fitted values for ?̂?𝑖𝑗 and 𝑒𝑖?̂? are then used to obtain a matrix, ?̂?, comprised of lags of 
independent variables and the stochastic error component; 
                                                        
8 The procedure can be strengthened against a violation of the I.I.D. assumption through use of 
bootstrapping methods, which can be employed to mitigate the effects of contemporaneous error co-
dependence between panels.  
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 𝑢𝑖?̂? = ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖?̂?
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
 
This matrix is then used to compute ?̂?𝑖(1) =  ?̂?(𝑢?̂?)/?̂?(∆𝑦𝑖𝑡), where ?̂?(. ) is the long 
run estimator of the standard error of the sample mean under serial dependence 
proposed by Newey and West (1994). Group test statistics can therefore be computed; 
 
𝐺𝜏 = 𝑁
−1 ∑
?̂?𝑖
𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐺𝑎 = 𝑁
−1 ∑
𝑇?̂?𝑖
?̂?𝑖(1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Panel test statistics are computed by regressing the first difference and lag of the 
dependent variable on the deterministic vector, lagged first differences of the 
dependent variable and contemporaneous and lagged values of  𝑥  to generate 
projection errors, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡̃  and ?̃?𝑖𝑡−1; 
 
 
𝑦𝑖?̃? = 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛿𝑖′̃𝑑𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖′̃𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖?̃?∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 −
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝜗𝑖?̃?∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡̃ = ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛿𝑖′̂𝑑𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖?̂?∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 −
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=−𝑞𝑖
 
 
These results are then used to estimate a common error-correction parameter, ?̂?, and 
its standard error, which can be used to construct the panel test statistics. The panel 
statistics are; 
 
𝑃𝜏 =
?̂?
𝑆𝐸(?̂?)
 
 
𝑃𝑎 = 𝑇?̂? 
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 These statistics can be normalized and compared to the left tale of the standard 
normal distribution in order to test hypotheses. The procedure is conveniently 
executed in Stata by the xtwest module by Persyn and Westerlund (2008). Two of the 
four test statistics strongly rejected the null at 5%, and three at 10%, providing 
evidence of the presence of cointegrating relationships within the panel as a whole. 
The results of this test can be seen in table 4 in the appendix. Individual error 
correction models were estimated firm-by-firm, and firms where the error correction 
term was not <0 and significant at the 5% level (i.e. when no equilibrium relationship 
between the natural log of CDS premiums and that of equity prices could be shown to 
exist at the 5% level) were not included in later models of the effects of changes in 
libor rates on disequilibrium.  
 
Results of tests for significant error correction terms, by firm, are provided in table 5 
of the appendix.  
 
A cointegrating relationship of the form; 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 ln 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
Was estimated, where the cointegrating vector  𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … ,112,  contained 
heterogeneous elements for all firms, allowing the cointegrating relationship to vary 
between firms. Statistical output corresponding to this equation estimation can be 
seen in table 6 of the appendix. Thus the estimate of the disequilibrium between the 
two markets was taken to be the exponential of the residuals of this cointegrating 
equation; 
 
𝜀?̂?𝑡 = exp{𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡} − exp {𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 ln 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡} 
 
The cointegration residuals for each firm in the dataset were demeaned and converted 
into absolute values, denoted 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡  and denominated in basis points. 
High positive values of 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 denote a high degree of disintegration in the 
equilibrium relationship between CDS premiums and equity prices. This 
disintegration can be in the positive or negative (CDS premiums are higher or lower 
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 than suggested by the estimated equilibrium relationship, respectively). When the 
value of 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 is zero, the CDS premium is at the level suggested by the 
postulated long-run equilibrium relationship with the equity price.  
 
The significance of interest rates and arbitrage costs, proxied by libor rates of various 
frequencies, was tested by regressing 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 on independent and control 
variables. A dynamic panel model was estimated by including two autoregressive 
terms, which was found to be free from problematic serial correlation of errors. To 
overcome the well-documented likelihood of parametric inconsistency arising from 
model dynamism 9 , models for the disequilibrium were estimated using the 
generalized method of moments based procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed resolving the parametric inconsistency of 
dynamic panel estimators by estimating a model of the form; 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜑(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖𝑡−1)
′𝛽 + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) 
 
using 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 to instrument (𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2). Assuming errors are serially uncorrelated, 
this procedure will provide consistent parameter estimates. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
improved on their procedure, demonstrating that increasing the number of lags of the 
dependent variable used as instruments will improve the efficiency of the resulting 
model. As this results in over identification, two-stage-least-squares or GMM is used 
for estimation. The estimator is; 
 
?̂? = [(∑ 𝑋𝑖′̃𝑍𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
) 𝑊𝑁 (∑ 𝑍𝑖
′𝑋?̃?
𝑁
𝑖=1
)]
−1
(∑ 𝑋𝑖′̃𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 𝑊𝑁 (∑ 𝑍𝑖
′𝑦?̃?
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 
 
Where ?̂? represents the coefficient on instrumented variables, 𝑋?̃? denotes a (T-2)(K+1) 
matrix with t’th row (Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡
′) for t = 3,…T. 𝑦?̃?  is a (T-2)(1) vector with tth 
row Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑊𝑁 is a weighting matrix and 𝑍𝑖 is a diagonal matrix of instruments; 
 
                                                        
9 See Nickell (1981). 
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 𝑍𝑖 = [
𝑧𝑖3
′ ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝑧𝑖𝑇
′
] 
 
The method is easily adapted to accommodate higher order autoregressive processes, 
and, provided certain assumptions used to construct moment conditions are met, is 
asymptotically consistent.  
 
One and two-step varieties of the procedure are available, the former of which is 
outlined above. The two-step version of the estimator is computed using the residual 
vectors of the one-step estimate, and is consistent and asymptotically efficient under 
panel-specific heteroskedasticity. The model for the disequilibrium is estimated using 
both one-step and two-step versions of the Arellano-Bond procedure. GMM standard 
errors computed via the two-stage procedure frequently suffer from substantive 
negative bias, leading to significant risk of under-rejection. For this reason, the 
standard errors in the two-step version of the model are adjusted in accordance with 
the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005), and those of the one-step version 
employ Arellano and Bond’s heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors.  
 
Thus, using the GMM-based procedure described above, a model of the following 
form is estimated; 
 
(1 − 𝜑1𝑖𝐿 − 𝜑2𝑖𝐿
2)𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝐿
𝑖(ℒ′𝛾) + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
3
𝑖=0
 
 
Where ℒ is a (24)(1) vector of the contemporaneously exogenous first, second and 
third differences of one month, three month and twelve month libor rates, as well as 
the squares of all said differences. 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  Is a vector of controls, transformed as necessary 
for stationarity. Two autoregressive disequilibrium terms are included, and are 
instrumented, via the one and two step procedure, employing the first ten available 
lagged values (i.e. disequilibrium 3-12 days prior to the present).  
 
15
Brown: Interest Rates and Arbitrage; Evidence from Dynamic Panel Analysis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 Aside from the libor rates, which constitute the key independent variables of interest, 
controls are selected for inclusion based upon economic theory. The first to third lags 
of equity closing bid-ask spreads are included to control for potential effects of the 
diversity of investors’ opinions and equity liquidity. Lagged differences of 
Bloomberg’s estimated, firm specific default probability control for firm-idiosyncratic 
risk. The percentage change in the firm’s equity price within the day is included as a 
control for volatility, and differences in Bloomberg’s credit stress index, Moody’s 
AAA bond yield index, and the spread of the US 10 year bond over 12-month libor 
are included to control for general credit market conditions.  
 
That the errors of the estimated model be serially uncorrelated beyond the first order 
is a crucial assumption of the Arellano-Bond method. This is tested using the test 
proposed by Arellano and Bond, by which we cannot reject the null of no 
autocorrelation beyond the first lag in any of the varieties of model specified. 
Sargan’s test of the validity of over identifying restrictions rejects the null of validity 
for the one-step model wherein ten lags of the dependent variable are used to 
instrument the autoregressive term. However, the test fails to reject the null of validity 
for the two-step model employing the same instruments. Models are estimated using 
the standard, non-robust variance-covariance matrix for the purposes of this test10. 
The results of the Sargan tests can be seen in table 7 of the appendix.  
 
Two models are therefore specified; 
1) Uses a one-step version of the Arellano-Bond estimator, with ten lags of the 
dependent variable as instruments.  
2) Uses a two-step version of the Arellano-Bond estimator, with ten lags of the 
dependent variable as instruments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 Sargan’s test cannot be carried out with Arellano-Bond robust errors, as the distribution of the test 
statistic is unknown.  
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 Results 
 
Consistently with Esen et al. (2015) and Chan et al. (2009), evidence is found of a 
statistically significant and negative cointegrating relationship between the natural 
logarithms of CDS premiums and equity prices. The cointegrating relationship is 
found to vary significantly between firms, and the estimated equilibrium relationship 
between equity prices and CDS premiums differs significantly from the group-wide 
relationship for 96.4% of cointegrating firms (at the 5% confidence level). The scale 
and direction of this relationship is unsurprising given the extensive theoretical and 
intuitive reasoning which links the equity and CDS markets together. A cointegrating 
relationship between the equity prices and CDS premiums of at least some firms is a 
presupposition of this paper’s research question and, as such, the precise details of 
this relationship are a secondary concern, which will not be explored in detail. 
However, a table of estimated cointegrating coefficients, and firm-by-firm results of 
Westerlund’s test for a significant error correction term, can be found in tables 5 and 
6 in the appendix.  
 
Although coefficient estimates between model 1 (calculated using the one-step 
Arellano Bond procedure with Arellano and Bond’s robust standard errors) and model 
2 (calculated using the two step procedure with Windmeijer's robust standard errors) 
do not differ to a statistically significant extent, and both methods provide 
asymptotically consistent parameter estimates, the statistical significance of 
uncovered marginal effects of libor changes does differ substantively by estimation 
method.   
 
One-month libor 
 
In line with expectation and theory, model 1 evidences a statistically significant, 
positive relationship between first-differenced one-month libor rates and the absolute 
value of the estimated disequilibrium. The relationship is significant at 5% for 
changes in one-month libor occurring two to three days before the present, but the 
coefficient on changes in one-month libor occurring the previous day is insignificant 
at 5%. A positive change in one-month libor rates on date t (equal to the mean daily 
change observed over the sampling period - +0.020% points) is found to reduce the 
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 absolute value of the disequilibrium by 0.0087 bps on date t+1, but increase it by 
0.2265 bps and 0.4742 bps on dates t+2 and t+3 respectively. The long run effect of 
such a change is to increase the extent to which equity prices and CDS premiums 
deviate from equilibrium by 2.0308 bps.  
 
The magnitude of expected effects in model 2 (using two-step Arellano-Bond 
estimation) is very similar to those in model 1 – an increase in one-month libor of 
0.02% points produces an expected long run increase in the extent of the 
disequilibrium between CDS premiums and equity prices of 1.9338 bps. However, 
when the two-step methodology is employed, coefficients on all lagged changes in 
libor are insignificant at 5%.  
 
Three-month libor 
 
The mean change in three-month libor rates observed during the sample period was an 
increase of 0.0395% points. Estimates derived in model 1 suggest such a change on 
date t will produce an expected change in the absolute value of disequilibrium of -
0.0801 bps, -0.1090 bps and -0.0262 bps on dates t+1, t+2 and t+3 respectively, with 
a long run effect of -0.2510 bps. Estimates derived in model 2 suggest a mean change 
in three month libor rates on date t will produce an expected increase in 
disequilibrium of -0.0767 bps, -0.1079 bps and -0.0466 bps on dates t+1, t+2 and t+3 
respectively, with a long run expected effect of -0.3261 bps. 
 
Coefficients on changes in three-month libor rates are not statistically significant at 
5% in either model 1 or model 2.  
 
Twelve-month libor 
 
Contrary to expectations, model 1 provides evidence of a negative association 
between twelve-month libor rates and the extent of the absolute estimated 
disequilibrium between CDS premiums and equity prices. Model 1 suggests that an 
increase in twelve month libor rates of 0.11% (the mean observed increase) on date t 
produces an expected decline in disequilibrium of 0.2368 bps, 0.5139 bps and 0.7701 
bps on dates t+1, t+2 and t+3 respectively, and has the long run effect of reducing the 
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 absolute value of disequilibrium by 3.6372 bps. Coefficients on the first, second and 
third lags of changes in twelve-month libor rates are all significant at 5%. Model 2 
yields similar results, the long run effect of a 0.11% increase in twelve-month libor 
rates being a reduction in the absolute value of the disequilibrium of 3.4026 bps. 
However, coefficients on the first, second and third lags of changes in twelve-month 
libor rates are not significant at 5% in model 2.  
 
A full table of coefficients for all models, and a table illustrating implied marginal 
effects, are provided in tables 8 and 9 of the appendix.  
 
Discussion  
 
The above findings as to the direction and order of magnitude of the marginal effects 
of changes in one-month libor rates are in accordance with existing literature and in 
line with expectations. Positive increases in one-month libor rates are associated with 
a increase in the absolute size of the disequilibrium between CDS premiums and 
equity prices – this makes intuitive sense, as increases in libor rates raise the cost of 
funding trades to close the disequilibrium. Arbitrage activity, which may otherwise 
return equity prices and CDS premiums to their equilibrium level over a number of 
days, becomes increasingly unprofitable and declines, causing the absolute level of 
the disequilibrium to be higher on subsequent days (after the libor rise) than it would 
have been had the usual volume of equilibrating trades occurred.   
 
More surprising and counterintuitive is the finding that changes in three and twelve 
month libor rates produce negative expected changes in the disequilibrium between 
equity prices and CDS premiums, i.e. that increasing longer-term interest rates cause 
the prices of the two securities to return towards their equilibrium levels. This 
equilibrating effect is not statistically significant at 5% for three-month libor rates in 
either model, but is significant for twelve-month rates in model 1.  
 
The difference between the directions of the marginal effects for changes in one 
month libor and changes in three and twelve month libor, and the fact that the 
magnitude of the marginal effect of the former is greater than for either of the latter, 
can be explained by the proposition that arbitrage traders favour shorter-term 
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 borrowing. If we accept this proposition, it stands to reason that the volume of 
arbitrage trading activity, and hence the extent of prevailing capital structure 
disequilibrium, should be more heavily determined by changes in short term 
borrowing rates than longer term rates. This hypothesis may explain why absolute 
disequilibrium and one month libor rates are positively linked (whereas 
disequilibrium and three and twelve month rates are negatively linked) and why the 
marginal effects of changes in one month libor rates are much larger in magnitude.  
 
The negative association between changes in three and twelve-month libor rates and 
the absolute value of disequilibrium are contrary to what may be expected, given the 
theory discussed in the introduction to this paper. Ostensibly, even given arbitrage 
trader’s potential preference for short-term vs. longer-term borrowings, this result is 
surprising. A potential explanation may be the potential for higher longer-term 
interest rates to attract capital away from equity markets, making fixed-income and 
money market securities comparatively more attractive, which, in turn, causes equity 
prices to fall towards their equilibrium level, with respect to CDS prices. This 
hypothesis would seem to imply that the majority of the disequilibrium between CDS 
premiums and equity prices is due to equity prices exceeding their equilibrium level 
(with respect to bond yields and CDS premiums), rather than being too low, relative 
to their equilibrium level.  
 
A further result of interest is the significance of extended lags of changes in one and 
twelve month libor rates. Changes in one and twelve month libor rates are found to 
have a statistically significant effect on disequilibrium levels up to three days after the 
change occurs, suggesting that equity and CDS markets adjust to new information 
somewhat slowly. This finding accords with the results of Downing et al (2007) and 
Bystrom (2005), who present further evidence of informational inefficiencies in the 
three markets relevant to the relationship between CDS premiums and equity prices 
(CDS, corporate bond and equity markets).  
 
The lack of statistical significance in model 2, and the lack of any significant marginal 
effect for changes in three-month libor rates according to either model, is puzzling 
and troublesome. A well-known problem with the two-step Arellano-Bond method is 
its proclivity to produce downward-biased standard errors in small samples, leading to 
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 an over-rejection of null hypotheses. Out of caution with respect to this issue, model 2 
has been estimated using Windmeijer’s robust standard errors, whereas model 1 is 
estimated using one-step standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Given the comparatively large size of this study’s sample, and the 
fact that the two-step downward bias is largely a small-sample problem, it is feasible 
that the Windmeijer-corrected standard errors of model 2 are over-conservative, 
leading to under-rejection of false nulls. The standard errors of one-step GMM 
estimators are known to be approximately asymptotically un-biased, if less efficient 
than those of two-step estimators, and for this reason researchers have traditionally 
reported results of one-step and two-step Arellano-Bond procedures together, using 
the standard errors of the former for inference. When the significance of coefficients 
estimated by model 2 is tested using the standard error estimates of model 1, similar 
patterns of significance exist between both models.  
 
Methodological evaluation and extensions 
 
This study contributes to the extensive subject literature by providing additional 
evidence as to the significance and causal nature of the relationship between changes 
in borrowing costs and CDS-equity market disequilibria. However, the ultimate 
picture remains incomplete.  
 
Contemporaneous regressors were not included within the final model of conditional 
disequilibria in order to ensure the condition of contemporaneous exogeneity of 
regressors was met. Pre-determined, weakly exogenous lags of variables were 
included in order to resolve this issue. Difficulties were encountered in the collection 
of granular, firm-level data regarding security prices and the idiosyncrasies of firms 
and securities pertaining to them, with coverage in some areas being extremely 
limited. Sourcing reliable information on specific CDS contracts beyond their 
premiums, such as their ownership, turnover and bid-ask spreads, proved infeasible, 
and hence the models estimated were constrained to assessing very high-level data. 
An area for future research is to test the sensitivity of the relationships discussed 
herein to inclusion of further variables describing specific equities and CDS contracts 
in greater detail, for instance CDS bid-ask spreads and traded volume.   
 
21
Brown: Interest Rates and Arbitrage; Evidence from Dynamic Panel Analysis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 Where previous literature on the subject of CDS and Equity market integration by the 
likes of Bystrom (2005) and Da Silva et al. (2014) has focussed on integration at the 
index-wide or market-wide level, this study contributes by examining integration 
between CDS premiums and equity prices at a firm-specific level for large-cap firms, 
with data collected at a daily frequency. Further research opportunities are available 
by allowing the frequency and granularity of observations to vary – results may differ 
substantively if the sampling frequency is adjusted to be higher (hourly or minutely) 
or lower (weekly or monthly).  
 
A further potential area for future research is the exploration of the marginal effects of 
libor upon disequilibria between the CDS premiums and equity prices of firms of 
differing size. This study has focussed exclusively on large-cap firms, a focus that 
was partly motivated by the diminished likelihood that one shareholder would 
individually control a significant stake. Smaller firms are more likely to be dominated 
by one individual or institutional shareholding, and therefore may be inherently more 
likely to experience disequilibria between the prices of their securities and those 
securities’ derivatives. It is conceivable, for instance, that the equity of a smaller firm 
may be significantly controlled by one investor, whereas the investor base for its 
credit (and, therefore, the base of individuals who may be active in the market for 
CDS contracts with that firm as an obligor) may be more broad and diverse. For such 
a firm, the price of its equity may be relatively fixed while the price of CDS contracts 
against its credit fluctuates much more. This may be particularly true if the major 
shareholder is a long-term investor (for instance, a founder or venture capitalist).  
 
Perhaps the most obvious and interesting extension to this paper involves the 
consideration of shorter-duration borrowing rates (e.g. one week and overnight libor 
rates), and the impact of changes in these upon CDS-equity market disequilibrium. 
The unexpected finding that increases in longer term libor rates have significant 
equilibrating effects also provides ample scope for future research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study examined the effect of changes in libor rates upon the extent of estimated 
disequilibrium between the equity prices and CDS premiums of individual firms. 
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 Evidence was presented of a cointegrating relationship between the natural logarithms 
of the two time series, allowing an equilibrium relationship to be estimated and 
estimated disequilibria calculated. Using one and two step Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimation procedures, changes in one month libor rates were found to have 
statistically significant, positive associations with the extent of the prevailing price 
disequilibrium. Counter-intuitively, a negative association was found for three and 
twelve month libor rates. The significance of lagged versions of libor variables 
suggested the association was causal, and provided further evidence regarding the 
informational inefficiency of markets.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for variables  
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 Table 2: Stationarity tests for lnequitycloseprice and lncdscloseprice 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Stationarity tests for independent variables in the final model 
 
 
 
Im-Pesaran-Shin	test
lncdscloseprice lnequitycloseprice
t	bar -1.9829 -1.5634
t	tilde	bar -1.8801 -1.5536
Z	t	tilde	bar -6.9987 -0.7877
P	Value 0.0000 0.2154
Outcome Reject Do	not	reject
H0:	All	panels	contain	unit	roots.	
Ha:	Some	panels	are	stationary
Hadri	test
lncdscloseprice lnequitycloseprice
Statistic 1200 1600
P	Value 0.0000 0.0000
Outcome Reject	 Reject
H0:	All	panels	are	stationary.	
Ha:	Some	panels	contain	unit	roots
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 Table 4: Westerlund’s panel cointegration test statistics (for whole panel) 
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 Table 5: Firm-by-firm results of Westerlund’s test for cointegration 
 
 
 
Firm		
Error	correction	
coefficient
P-value
Cointegration	
Evidenced?
3M	Co -0.0597 0.0220 Y
ACE	Ltd 0.0085 0.3210 N
AES	Corp -0.0358 0.0700 N
AT&T	Inc -0.0063 0.3370 N
Abbott	Laboratories -0.0333 0.0030 Y
Aetna	Inc -0.0089 0.1810 N
Agilent	Technologies	Inc -0.1188 0.0060 Y
Air	Products	and	Chemicals	Inc -0.0364 0.0310 Y
Alcoa	Inc -0.0560 0.0090 Y
Allstate	Corp -0.0004 0.9660 N
Altria	Group	Inc -0.0134 0.1380 N
Ameren	Corp -0.0108 0.3230 N
American	Electric	Power	Company	Inc -0.0105 0.2450 N
American	Express	Co -0.0297 0.0410 Y
American	International	Group	Inc -0.0392 0.0060 Y
American	Tower	Corp -0.0449 0.0140 Y
AmerisourceBergen	Corp -0.0471 0.0240 Y
Amgen	Inc 0.0108 0.1450 N
Anadarko	Petroleum	Corp -0.0341 0.0460 Y
Analog	Devices	Inc -0.0356 0.0280 Y
Apache	Corp -0.0190 0.0940 N
Apple	Inc -0.0876 0.0040 Y
Applied	Materials	Inc -0.0300 0.0850 N
Archer	Daniels	Midland	Co -0.0837 0.0250 Y
Assurant	Inc -0.0325 0.1110 N
AutoNation	Inc -0.0284 0.0320 Y
Autozone	Inc -0.0253 0.0700 N
AvalonBay	Communities	Inc -0.0073 0.4920 N
BB&T	Corp -0.0316 0.0050 Y
Baker	Hughes	Inc -0.0140 0.3330 N
Ball	Corp -0.1877 0.0010 Y
Bank	of	America	Corp -0.0867 0.0000 Y
Baxter	International	Inc -0.0049 0.4620 N
Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc -0.0494 0.0090 Y
Best	Buy	Co	Inc -0.0452 0.0080 Y
Boeing	Co -0.0350 0.0980 N
BorgWarner	Inc -0.0267 0.1000 N
Boston	Properties	Inc -0.0268 0.1060 N
Boston	Scientific	Corp -0.0196 0.3180 N
Bristol-Myers	Squibb	Co -0.0171 0.1520 N
CA	Inc 0.0044 0.6460 N
CBS	Corp -0.0081 0.7000 N
CMS	Energy	Corp -0.0374 0.0570 N
CSX	Corp 0.0028 0.7060 N
CVS	Health	Corp -0.0037 0.6360 N
Cablevision	Systems	Corp -0.0552 0.0020 Y
Campbell	Soup	Co -0.0255 0.0310 Y
Capital	One	Financial	Corp -0.0158 0.1170 N
Cardinal	Health	Inc -0.0221 0.1760 N
Carnival	Corp -0.0251 0.1430 N
Caterpillar	Inc -0.0279 0.0610 N
CenterPoint	Energy	Inc -0.0510 0.0100 Y
CenturyLink	Inc -0.1021 0.0000 Y
Chesapeake	Energy	Corp -0.0461 0.0800 N
Chevron	Corp -0.0228 0.0720 N
Chubb	Corp -0.0299 0.0160 Y
Cigna	Corp -0.0159 0.0820 N
Cisco	Systems	Inc -0.0153 0.3450 N
Citigroup	Inc -0.0347 0.0290 Y
Clorox	Co -0.0441 0.0320 Y
Coca-Cola	Co -0.0293 0.0430 Y
Colgate-Palmolive	Co -0.0435 0.0830 N
Comcast	Corp -0.0048 0.7190 N
ConAgra	Foods	Inc -0.0216 0.0900 N
ConocoPhillips -0.0281 0.0930 N
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Firm
Error	correction	
coefficient
P-value
Cointegration	
Evidenced?
Constellation	Brands	Inc -0.0281 0.0930 N
Corning	Inc -0.0947 0.0030 Y
Costco	Wholesale	Corp -0.0649 0.0010 Y
Cummins	Inc 0.0040 0.7380 N
D.R.	Horton	Inc 0.0047 0.7500 N
DTE	Energy	Co -0.0346 0.0660 N
DaVita	HealthCare	Partners	Inc -0.0389 0.0340 Y
Danaher	Corp -0.0001 0.8520 N
Darden	Restaurants	Inc -0.0026 0.8140 N
Deere	&	Co -0.0528 0.0040 Y
Delta	Air	Lines	Inc -0.0066 0.6760 N
Devon	Energy	Corp -0.0653 0.0030 Y
Diamond	Offshore	Drilling	Inc -0.0197 0.0340 Y
Dominion	Resources	Inc -0.0181 0.0780 N
Dover	Corp -0.0008 0.9680 N
Dow	Chemical	Co -0.0170 0.4340 N
E	I	du	Pont	de	Nemours	and	Co -0.0060 0.6010 N
EMC	Corp -0.0569 0.0140 Y
EOG	Resources	Inc -0.1063 0.0010 Y
Eastman	Chemical	Co -0.0244 0.1630 N
Ecolab	Inc 0.0000 0.7220 N
Eli	Lilly	and	Co -0.0706 0.0280 Y
Emerson	Electric	Co -0.0565 0.0450 Y
Entergy	Corp -0.0352 0.0870 N
Estee	Lauder	Companies	Inc -0.0254 0.1200 N
Eversource	Energy -0.3497 0.0000 Y
Exelon	Corp -0.0464 0.0010 Y
Expedia	Inc -0.0259 0.0630 N
Exxon	Mobil	Corp -0.0148 0.1710 N
FMC	Corp -0.0874 0.0480 Y
FedEx	Corp -0.0299 0.0280 Y
FirstEnergy	Corp -0.0381 0.0040 Y
Ford	Motor	Co -0.0066 0.7330 N
Freeport-McMoRan	Inc -0.0675 0.0110 Y
Frontier	Communications	Corp 0.0035 0.7600 N
Gap	Inc -0.0281 0.0060 Y
General	Dynamics	Corp -0.1163 0.0010 Y
General	Mills	Inc -0.0182 0.0880 N
General	Motors	Co -0.0593 0.0090 Y
Goldman	Sachs	Group	Inc -0.0825 0.0010 Y
Goodyear	Tire	&	Rubber	Co -0.0085 0.5900 N
HCP	Inc -0.0258 0.0370 Y
Halliburton	Co -0.0051 0.6240 N
Harris	Corp -0.2508 0.0000 Y
Hartford	Financial	Services	Group	Inc -0.0613 0.0020 Y
Hasbro	Inc -0.0262 0.0480 Y
Hershey	Co -0.0529 0.0040 Y
Hess	Corp -0.0337 0.0160 Y
Home	Depot	Inc -0.0130 0.2270 N
Honeywell	International	Inc -0.0177 0.0950 N
Host	Hotels	&	Resorts	Inc -0.0390 0.0890 N
Humana	Inc -0.0185 0.2030 N
Illinois	Tool	Works	Inc -0.1693 0.0000 Y
Intel	Corp -0.0072 0.6270 N
International	Business	Machines	Corp -0.0480 0.0160 Y
International	Paper	Co -0.0542 0.0010 Y
Interpublic	Group	of	Companies	Inc -0.0343 0.0000 Y
Intuit	Inc -0.0543 0.0340 Y
JPMorgan	Chase	&	Co -0.0422 0.0190 Y
Johnson	&	Johnson -0.0083 0.4370 N
Johnson	Controls	Inc 0.0050 0.6590 N
Juniper	Networks	Inc -0.0223 0.1430 N
Kellogg	Co -0.0271 0.0800 N
KeyCorp -0.0099 0.3370 N
Kimberly-Clark	Corp -0.0205 0.0780 N
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Firm
Error	correction	
coefficient
P-value
Cointegration	
Evidenced?
Kimco	Realty	Corp -0.0173 0.1320 N
Kinder	Morgan	Inc -0.0173 0.1730 N
Kohls	Corp -0.0715 0.0050 Y
Kroger	Co -0.0055 0.4730 N
L	Brands	Inc -0.0201 0.2610 N
Laboratory	Corporation	of	America	Holdings -0.0357 0.0100 Y
Lennar	Corp -0.0740 0.0020 Y
Level	3	Communications	Inc -0.0481 0.0120 Y
Lincoln	National	Corp -0.0029 0.7180 N
Lockheed	Martin	Corp -0.0101 0.1200 N
Loews	Corp -0.0214 0.1230 N
Lowe's	Companies	Inc 0.0037 0.6840 N
Macys	Inc 0.0003 0.9770 N
Marathon	Oil	Corp -0.0261 0.0230 Y
Marriott	International	Inc 0.0016 0.9170 N
Marsh	&	McLennan	Companies	Inc 0.0038 0.5110 N
Martin	Marietta	Materials	Inc -0.2621 0.0000 Y
Masco	Corp -0.0115 0.1920 N
Mattel	Inc -0.0137 0.2180 N
McDonald's	Corp -0.0341 0.0010 Y
McKesson	Corp -0.0234 0.1710 N
Merck	&	Co	Inc -0.0415 0.0240 Y
Metlife	Inc -0.0493 0.0330 Y
Micron	Technology	Inc -0.4136 0.0000 Y
Microsoft	Corp -0.1807 0.0000 Y
Mohawk	Industries	Inc -0.0763 0.0080 Y
Molson	Coors	Brewing	Co -0.2412 0.0000 Y
Mondelez	International	Inc -0.0264 0.1040 N
Monsanto	Co 0.0169 0.0780 N
Morgan	Stanley -0.0718 0.0030 Y
Motorola	Solutions	Inc -0.0066 0.5140 N
Murphy	Oil	Corp -0.0185 0.0550 N
NRG	Energy	Inc -0.0424 0.0070 Y
Newell	Rubbermaid	Inc -0.0186 0.0820 N
Newmont	Mining	Corp -0.0255 0.2570 N
NextEra	Energy	Inc -0.0179 0.1100 N
Nike	Inc -0.0534 0.1500 N
Noble	Energy	Inc -0.0173 0.1700 N
Nordstrom	Inc -0.0214 0.1780 N
Norfolk	Southern	Corp -0.0201 0.1300 N
Northrop	Grumman	Corp -0.0119 0.1830 N
Nucor	Corp -0.0044 0.8310 N
ONEOK	Inc -0.0180 0.0630 N
Occidental	Petroleum	Corp -0.0413 0.0040 Y
Omnicom	Group	Inc 0.0030 0.8270 N
Oracle	Corp -0.0177 0.1320 N
Owens-Illinois	Inc -0.0325 0.0380 Y
PNC	Financial	Services	Group	Inc -0.2627 0.0000 Y
PPG	Industries	Inc -0.0325 0.0600 N
Pepco	Holdings	Inc -0.0459 0.0210 Y
PepsiCo	Inc -0.0130 0.2200 N
PerkinElmer	Inc -0.0251 0.1170 N
Philip	Morris	International	Inc -0.0550 0.0180 Y
Pioneer	Natural	Resources	Co -0.0287 0.0270 Y
Pitney	Bowes	Inc -0.0264 0.0200 Y
Praxair	Inc -0.0316 0.0950 N
Principal	Financial	Group	Inc -0.1561 0.0020 Y
Procter	&	Gamble	Co -0.0204 0.0340 Y
Prudential	Financial	Inc -0.0159 0.1670 N
PulteGroup	Inc -0.0922 0.0000 Y
Quest	Diagnostics	Inc -0.0143 0.2250 N
Raytheon	Co -0.0253 0.0800 N
Regions	Financial	Corp 0.0000 0.9440 N
Republic	Services	Inc -0.0098 0.2760 N
Reynolds	American	Inc -0.0206 0.0330 Y
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Firm
Error	correction	
coefficient
P-value
Cointegration	
Evidenced?
Rockwell	Automation	Inc -0.0148 0.131 N
Royal	Caribbean	Cruises	Ltd -0.0602 0.005 Y
Ryder	System	Inc -0.0233 0.058 N
Schlumberger	NV -0.1367 0.004 Y
Sealed	Air	Corp -0.0567 0.005 Y
Sempra	Energy -0.0272 0.104 N
Sherwin-Williams	Co 0.0049 0.77 N
Southern	Co -0.2121 0 Y
Southwest	Airlines	Co -0.0107 0.374 N
Stanley	Black	&	Decker	Inc -0.0293 0.116 N
Staples	Inc -0.0462 0.004 Y
Starwood	Hotels	&	Resorts	Worldwide	Inc -0.0271 0.039 Y
Sysco	Corp -0.2947 0 Y
TE	Connectivity	Ltd 0.0015 0.891 N
TECO	Energy	Inc -0.0114 0.391 N
TJX	Companies	Inc -0.0399 0.03 Y
Target	Corp -0.0190 0.165 N
Tegna	Inc -0.0396 0.033 Y
Tenet	Healthcare	Corp -0.1140 0 Y
Tesoro	Corp -0.0492 0.009 Y
Texas	Instruments	Inc -0.2980 0 Y
Textron	Inc -0.0256 0.105 N
Thermo	Fisher	Scientific	Inc -0.6606 0 Y
Time	Warner	Cable	Inc -0.0224 0.048 Y
Time	Warner	Inc 0.0035 0.84 N
Travelers	Companies	Inc 0.0040 0.671 N
Tyson	Foods	Inc -0.0405 0.001 Y
U.S.	Bancorp -0.0377 0.001 Y
Union	Pacific	Corp -0.0328 0.02 Y
United	Continental	Holdings	Inc -0.0559 0.002 Y
United	Parcel	Service	Inc -0.0272 0.174 N
United	Rentals	Inc -0.1067 0.007 Y
United	Technologies	Corp -0.0160 0.334 N
Universal	Health	Services	Inc -0.0303 0.057 N
Unum	Group 0.0094 0.569 N
VF	Corp -0.0289 0.138 N
Valero	Energy	Corp -0.0274 0.061 N
Viacom	Inc -0.0197 0.346 N
Vulcan	Materials	Co -0.1284 0 Y
Wal	Mart	Stores	Inc -0.0672 0.061 N
Walt	Disney	Co 0.0011 0.909 N
Waste	Management	Inc -0.0022 0.818 N
Wells	Fargo	&	Co -0.0084 0.512 N
Western	Union	Co -0.0450 0.002 Y
Weyerhaeuser	Co -0.0366 0 Y
Whirlpool	Corp 0.0073 0.42 N
Williams	Companies	Inc -0.0235 0.021 Y
Wyndham	Worldwide	Corp -0.0344 0.224 N
Xcel	Energy	Inc -0.1822 0 Y
Xerox	Corp -0.0490 0.032 Y
Yum!	Brands	Inc -0.0235 0.041 Y
eBay	Inc 0.0000 0.972 N
Becton	Dickinson	and	Co -0.0296 0.1 N
HP	Inc -0.0594 0 Y
Welltower	Inc -0.0038 0.713 N
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 Table 6: Cointegrating regression output 
Variable Coefficient Std.	errors t	statistic P-value
Equity	close	price
L1. -0.2711027 0.0414282 -6.54 0.000 -0.3523006 -0.1899049
Equity	close	price	-	firm	specific	effect
3M	Co -0.5896429 0.0412606 -14.29 0.000 -0.6705122 -0.5087737
Abbott	Laboratories -0.736816 0.04135 -17.82 0.000 -0.8178604 -0.6557715
Agilent	Technologies	Inc -0.4129347 0.041377 -9.98 0.000 -0.4940321 -0.3318373
Air	Products	and	Chemicals	Inc -0.3915903 0.0412614 -9.49 0.000 -0.4724611 -0.3107195
Alcoa	Inc -0.4771377 0.0417517 -11.43 0.000 -0.5589695 -0.395306
American	Express	Co -0.4777123 0.0412984 -11.57 0.000 -0.5586557 -0.396769
American	International	Group	Inc -0.4866618 0.0413234 -11.78 0.000 -0.5676541 -0.4056695
American	Tower	Corp -0.1630968 0.041285 -3.95 0.000 -0.244014 -0.0821797
AmerisourceBergen	Corp -0.4759201 0.0412723 -11.53 0.000 -0.5568123 -0.395028
Anadarko	Petroleum	Corp -0.3050562 0.0413074 -7.39 0.000 -0.3860173 -0.2240951
Analog	Devices	Inc -0.4694936 0.0413209 -11.36 0.000 -0.550481 -0.3885062
Apple	Inc -0.5622376 0.0412686 -13.62 0.000 -0.6431225 -0.4813526
Archer	Daniels	Midland	Co -0.6044574 0.0413497 -14.62 0.000 -0.6855012 -0.5234135
AutoNation	Inc 0.0197612 0.0413168 0.48 0.632 -0.0612183 0.1007407
BB&T	Corp -0.450654 0.0413803 -10.89 0.000 -0.5317578 -0.3695501
Ball	Corp -0.2808059 0.0413071 -6.8 0.000 -0.3617664 -0.1998453
Bank	of	America	Corp -0.75215 0.0416186 -18.07 0.000 -0.8337209 -0.6705791
Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc -0.3430536 0.0412646 -8.31 0.000 -0.4239307 -0.2621765
Best	Buy	Co	Inc -0.1822192 0.0413872 -4.4 0.000 -0.2633367 -0.1011017
Cablevision	Systems	Corp -0.2219102 0.0415069 -5.35 0.000 -0.3032622 -0.1405582
Campbell	Soup	Co -0.5335081 0.0413472 -12.9 0.000 -0.6145472 -0.452469
CenterPoint	Energy	Inc -0.77104 0.0415343 -18.56 0.000 -0.8524457 -0.6896342
CenturyLink	Inc -0.2193406 0.0414101 -5.3 0.000 -0.3005028 -0.1381783
Chubb	Corp -0.6371131 0.0412683 -15.44 0.000 -0.7179976 -0.5562287
Citigroup	Inc -0.4285149 0.0413329 -10.37 0.000 -0.5095259 -0.347504
Clorox	Co -0.3807419 0.0412698 -9.23 0.000 -0.4616291 -0.2998547
Coca-Cola	Co -0.7588125 0.04137 -18.34 0.000 -0.8398961 -0.6777289
Corning	Inc -0.7849073 0.0415358 -18.9 0.000 -0.866316 -0.7034986
Costco	Wholesale	Corp -0.5689143 0.0412597 -13.79 0.000 -0.6497818 -0.4880468
DaVita	HealthCare	Partners	Inc -0.0801012 0.0412965 -1.94 0.052 -0.1610409 0.0008385
Deere	&	Co -0.5106669 0.0412881 -12.37 0.000 -0.5915902 -0.4297437
Devon	Energy	Corp -0.3472146 0.0413417 -8.4 0.000 -0.4282428 -0.2661864
Diamond	Offshore	Drilling	Inc -0.1576436 0.0414479 -3.8 0.000 -0.23888 -0.0764072
EMC	Corp -0.6014542 0.0414572 -14.51 0.000 -0.6827089 -0.5201996
EOG	Resources	Inc -0.4406993 0.0412967 -10.67 0.000 -0.5216394 -0.3597592
Eli	Lilly	and	Co -0.6184439 0.0412928 -14.98 0.000 -0.6993763 -0.5375115
Emerson	Electric	Co -0.540706 0.0413367 -13.08 0.000 -0.6217243 -0.4596876
Eversource	Energy -0.6164256 0.0413409 -14.91 0.000 -0.6974524 -0.5353989
Exelon	Corp -0.6457122 0.0414037 -15.6 0.000 -0.726862 -0.5645624
FMC	Corp -0.3673338 0.041344 -8.88 0.000 -0.4483666 -0.2863011
FedEx	Corp -0.3571403 0.0412571 -8.66 0.000 -0.4380027 -0.2762778
FirstEnergy	Corp -0.4303238 0.0413958 -10.4 0.000 -0.5114581 -0.3491894
Freeport-McMoRan	Inc -0.2605359 0.0415868 -6.26 0.000 -0.3420446 -0.1790273
Gap	Inc -0.4499672 0.0413878 -10.87 0.000 -0.5310858 -0.3688486
General	Dynamics	Corp -0.5618817 0.0412606 -13.62 0.000 -0.642751 -0.4810123
General	Motors	Co -0.3337339 0.0414081 -8.06 0.000 -0.4148922 -0.2525756
Goldman	Sachs	Group	Inc -0.233608 0.0412525 -5.66 0.000 -0.3144614 -0.1527547
HCP	Inc -0.447365 0.0413729 -10.81 0.000 -0.5284544 -0.3662756
Harris	Corp -0.4107945 0.0412974 -9.95 0.000 -0.4917359 -0.329853
Hartford	Financial	Services	Group	Inc -0.532048 0.0413571 -12.86 0.000 -0.6131064 -0.4509895
Hasbro	Inc -0.4028932 0.0412993 -9.76 0.000 -0.4838382 -0.3219481
Hershey	Co -0.5049696 0.041283 -12.23 0.000 -0.5858828 -0.4240565
Hess	Corp -0.2369478 0.0413243 -5.73 0.000 -0.3179419 -0.1559537
Illinois	Tool	Works	Inc -0.5280359 0.041287 -12.79 0.000 -0.6089569 -0.4471148
International	Business	Machines	Corp -0.3653016 0.0412669 -8.85 0.000 -0.4461832 -0.2844201
Confidence	bands
Random	Effects	GLS	Regression,	dependent	variable	is	lncdscloseprice
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International	Paper	Co -0.4590891 0.0413428 -11.1 0.000 -0.5401196 -0.3780586
Interpublic	Group	of	Companies	Inc -0.7039744 0.0415396 -16.95 0.000 -0.7853905 -0.6225584
Intuit	Inc -0.3672106 0.0412827 -8.9 0.000 -0.4481232 -0.286298
JPMorgan	Chase	&	Co -0.4390643 0.041314 -10.63 0.000 -0.5200381 -0.3580904
Kohls	Corp -0.3462514 0.0413196 -8.38 0.000 -0.4272363 -0.2652665
Laboratory	Corporation	of	America	Holdings -0.2247598 0.0412696 -5.45 0.000 -0.3056467 -0.1438728
Lennar	Corp -0.205884 0.041337 -4.98 0.000 -0.2869029 -0.124865
Level	3	Communications	Inc -0.1839653 0.0413395 -4.45 0.000 -0.2649892 -0.1029415
Marathon	Oil	Corp -0.404639 0.0414857 -9.75 0.000 -0.4859495 -0.3233286
Martin	Marietta	Materials	Inc -0.2791143 0.0412566 -6.77 0.000 -0.3599759 -0.1982528
McDonald's	Corp -0.5024723 0.041282 -12.17 0.000 -0.5833836 -0.421561
Merck	&	Co	Inc -0.7173952 0.0413284 -17.36 0.000 -0.7983974 -0.636393
Metlife	Inc -0.4494493 0.0413388 -10.87 0.000 -0.5304718 -0.3684269
Micron	Technology	Inc -0.1328927 0.0414772 -3.2 0.001 -0.2141864 -0.0515989
Microsoft	Corp -0.7128498 0.0413564 -17.24 0.000 -0.7939069 -0.6317926
Mohawk	Industries	Inc -0.2733921 0.0412467 -6.63 0.000 -0.3542342 -0.19255
Molson	Coors	Brewing	Co -0.4220054 0.0413033 -10.22 0.000 -0.5029584 -0.3410525
Morgan	Stanley -0.4899053 0.0413879 -11.84 0.000 -0.5710241 -0.4087865
NRG	Energy	Inc -0.1205883 0.041488 -2.91 0.004 -0.2019034 -0.0392733
Occidental	Petroleum	Corp -0.3678596 0.0413072 -8.91 0.000 -0.4488202 -0.2868991
Owens-Illinois	Inc -0.3085232 0.0415011 -7.43 0.000 -0.3898639 -0.2271824
PNC	Financial	Services	Group	Inc -0.3707054 0.0412845 -8.98 0.000 -0.4516215 -0.2897894
Pepco	Holdings	Inc -0.6351558 0.0414615 -15.32 0.000 -0.7164188 -0.5538928
Philip	Morris	International	Inc -0.5553441 0.0412944 -13.45 0.000 -0.6362797 -0.4744084
Pioneer	Natural	Resources	Co -0.2002875 0.0412771 -4.85 0.000 -0.2811891 -0.1193859
Pitney	Bowes	Inc -0.5432853 0.0415129 -13.09 0.000 -0.6246491 -0.4619216
Principal	Financial	Group	Inc -0.4482429 0.0413405 -10.84 0.000 -0.5292688 -0.3672169
Procter	&	Gamble	Co -0.6553203 0.0412989 -15.87 0.000 -0.7362646 -0.574376
PulteGroup	Inc -0.4123334 0.0415299 -9.93 0.000 -0.4937306 -0.3309363
Reynolds	American	Inc -0.5896867 0.0413754 -14.25 0.000 -0.670781 -0.5085924
Royal	Caribbean	Cruises	Ltd -0.1950584 0.041287 -4.72 0.000 -0.2759793 -0.1141375
Schlumberger	NV -0.4823365 0.0412999 -11.68 0.000 -0.5632827 -0.4013902
Sealed	Air	Corp -0.2805603 0.0413424 -6.79 0.000 -0.36159 -0.1995306
Southern	Co -0.5549167 0.0413543 -13.42 0.000 -0.6359697 -0.4738638
Staples	Inc -0.4515699 0.0416555 -10.84 0.000 -0.5332132 -0.3699266
Starwood	Hotels	&	Resorts	Worldwide	Inc -0.3739006 0.0413014 -9.05 0.000 -0.4548499 -0.2929514
Sysco	Corp -0.5851295 0.0413777 -14.14 0.000 -0.6662283 -0.5040308
TJX	Companies	Inc -0.6067516 0.0413035 -14.69 0.000 -0.687705 -0.5257982
Tegna	Inc -0.2571514 0.0414577 -6.2 0.000 -0.3384071 -0.1758958
Tenet	Healthcare	Corp -0.0568516 0.0413471 -1.37 0.169 -0.1378904 0.0241872
Tesoro	Corp -0.1486264 0.0412786 -3.6 0.000 -0.229531 -0.0677217
Texas	Instruments	Inc -0.5938999 0.0413348 -14.37 0.000 -0.6749147 -0.5128851
Thermo	Fisher	Scientific	Inc -0.3966244 0.0412682 -9.61 0.000 -0.4775085 -0.3157402
Time	Warner	Cable	Inc -0.2586158 0.0412527 -6.27 0.000 -0.3394696 -0.177762
Tyson	Foods	Inc -0.5182274 0.041365 -12.53 0.000 -0.5993013 -0.4371536
U.S.	Bancorp -0.5285831 0.0413599 -12.78 0.000 -0.6096469 -0.4475192
Union	Pacific	Corp -0.6312507 0.0412838 -15.29 0.000 -0.7121654 -0.550336
United	Continental	Holdings	Inc -0.0441609 0.0413181 -1.07 0.285 -0.1251429 0.0368212
United	Rentals	Inc -0.091491 0.0413034 -2.22 0.027 -0.1724441 -0.0105378
Vulcan	Materials	Co -0.2567257 0.0412803 -6.22 0.000 -0.3376337 -0.1758177
Western	Union	Co -0.4731705 0.0415599 -11.39 0.000 -0.5546263 -0.3917146
Weyerhaeuser	Co -0.656691 0.0414153 -15.86 0.000 -0.7378635 -0.5755186
Williams	Companies	Inc -0.2519069 0.0413468 -6.09 0.000 -0.3329451 -0.1708688
Xcel	Energy	Inc -0.7441158 0.0413983 -17.97 0.000 -0.8252549 -0.6629767
Xerox	Corp -0.7695887 0.0418008 -18.41 0.000 -0.8515168 -0.6876606
Yum!	Brands	Inc -0.3765965 0.0412917 -9.12 0.000 -0.4575267 -0.2956662
HP	Inc -0.6838485 0.0416676 -16.41 0.000 -0.7655155 -0.6021814
Constant 7.122658 0.0260057 273.89 0.000 7.071688 7.173628
N 112 Within	R2 0.1851
T 248 Between	R2 1.0000
Obs. 27776 Overall	R2 0.9778
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 Table 7: Results of Arellano and Bond and Sargan tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arellano	-	Bond	test	for	zero	autocorrelation	in	first-differenced	residuals
H0:	No	autocorrelation.
Order Z	statistic P-value Outcome Z	statistic P-value Outcome
1 -3.9702 0.0001 Reject -3.9181 0.0001 Reject
2 0.92409 0.3554 Cannot	reject 0.87835 0.3798 Cannot	reject
H0:	Overidentifying	restrictions	are	valid
Chi	Sq.	
Degrees	of	
freedom
P-value Outcome
One-step	
method
25463.49 2389 0.0000 Reject
Two-step	
method
88.54 2389 1.0000 Cannot	reject
Sargan	test	of	overidentifying	restrictions
N.B.	Sargan	test	cannot	be	calculated	with	robust	variance-
covariance	matrices	as	distribution	of	test	statistic	is	unknown.	
Results	have	been	calculated	using	the	standard	GMM	vce,	rather	
than	the	robust	version.	
Instrumented	with	1st	-	10th	Lag
One-step	method Two-step	method
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 Table 8a: Statistical output for model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. Std.	Err. z P-value
absdisequilibrium
L1. 0.8497375 0.0283916 29.93 0.000 0.7940911 0.9053839
L2. -0.0989395 0.0227184 -4.36 0.000 -0.1434668 -0.0544122
onemonthlibor
LD. -43.9438 429.5148 -0.1 0.919 -885.7773 797.8897
L2D. 1177.606 570.2741 2.06 0.039 59.88953 2295.323
L3D. 1413.535 463.8785 3.05 0.002 504.3497 2322.72
onemonthlibor2
LD. 1.663398 1250.333 0 0.999 -2448.944 2452.271
L2D. -3427.032 1699.587 -2.02 0.044 -6758.162 -95.90252
L3D. -3992.767 1346.312 -2.97 0.003 -6631.489 -1354.045
threemonthlibor
LD. -202.987 352.9698 -0.58 0.565 -894.795 488.821
L2D. -103.604 328.3039 -0.32 0.752 -747.0678 539.8597
L3D. 148.2076 275.2692 0.54 0.590 -391.3101 687.7252
threemonthlibor2
LD. 182.3188 640.6771 0.28 0.776 -1073.385 1438.023
L2D. 20.4086 594.3596 0.03 0.973 -1144.515 1185.332
L3D. -404.1482 519.1845 -0.78 0.436 -1421.731 613.4347
twelvemonthlibor
LD. -214.8574 89.61737 -2.4 0.017 -390.5042 -39.21058
L2D. -283.6204 99.2475 -2.86 0.004 -478.142 -89.09891
L3D. -323.7356 120.0797 -2.7 0.007 -559.0875 -88.38365
twelvemonthlibor2
LD. 152.2602 64.41092 2.36 0.018 26.01708 278.5033
L2D. 187.4168 72.21342 2.6 0.009 45.8811 328.9525
L3D. 212.6304 85.0407 2.5 0.012 45.95372 379.3071
moodysaaabondindex
L1. -4.029623 3.521965 -1.14 0.253 -10.93255 2.873302
twi
LD. 0.2252483 0.1203731 1.87 0.061 -0.0106787 0.4611753
equityclosebidaskspread
L1. -0.0051589 0.0804578 -0.06 0.949 -0.1628532 0.1525354
L2. 0.3925152 0.1739997 2.26 0.024 0.0514821 0.7335484
us10yrspreadoverlibor
L1. 2.746642 2.764101 0.99 0.32 -2.670897 8.164181
L2. 3.091149 3.29423 0.94 0.348 -3.365423 9.547721
pdequitywithin
L1. 18.33819 12.17511 1.51 0.132 -5.524587 42.20097
lnequityvolumes
L1. 0.9342351 0.3284062 2.84 0.004 0.2905708 1.577899
pdefault
LD. 0.5266619 0.3957261 1.33 0.183 -0.2489471 1.302271
creditmarketsclevelandstress
L1. -10.9779 2.020377 -5.43 0.000 -14.93777 -7.018036
Constant
63.83543 15.63446 4.08 0.000 33.19245 94.47841
27,440 2400
112 11,933.20
245 0.000
One-step	estimation	with	Arellano-Bond	robust	standard	errors
95%	Confidence	bounds
(N)T Instruments
N Wald	Chi	2(30)
T Prob	>	Chi	2
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 Table 8b: Statistical output for model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. Std.	Err. z P-value
absdisequilibrium
L1.** 0.8499585 0.0280237 30.33 0.000 0.7950331 0.9048839
L1.** -0.1019276 0.0174777 -5.83 0.000 -0.1361832 -0.0676719
onemonthlibor
LD. -17.13052 1269.04 -0.01 0.989 -2504.404 2470.143
L2D.* 1087.012 1963.249 0.55 0.580 -2760.884 4934.908
L3D.** 1382.598 2266.411 0.61 0.542 -3059.486 5824.683
onemonthlibor2
LD. -74.38232 3506.768 -0.02 0.983 -6947.522 6798.757
L2D.* -3165.606 5772.904 -0.55 0.583 -14480.29 8149.077
L3D.** -3915.033 6809.12 -0.57 0.565 -17260.66 9430.597
threemonthlibor
LD. -194.2752 1086.897 -0.18 0.858 -2324.555 1936.005
L2D. -108.2466 1297.854 -0.08 0.934 -2651.995 2435.501
L3D. 94.46399 2428.061 0.04 0.969 -4664.448 4853.376
threemonthlibor2
LD. 173.6205 2031.397 0.09 0.932 -3807.844 4155.085
L2D. 30.28265 2577.401 0.01 0.991 -5021.33 5081.895
L3D. -303.8284 4587.573 -0.07 0.947 -9295.307 8687.65
twelvemonthlibor
LD.** -207.733 612.5228 -0.34 0.735 -1408.256 992.7896
L2D.** -269.5141 436.322 -0.62 0.537 -1124.69 585.6613
L3D.** -300.4713 528.1043 -0.57 0.569 -1335.537 734.594
twelvemonthlibor2
LD.** 146.9123 467.41 0.31 0.753 -769.1944 1063.019
L2D.** 178.2555 341.4063 0.52 0.602 -490.8885 847.3995
L3D.** 196.7555 392.0311 0.5 0.616 -571.6113 965.1223
moodysaaabondindex
L1. -3.913431 15.08791 -0.26 0.795 -33.48519 25.65833
twi	
LD. 0.2166615 0.4002337 0.54 0.588 -0.5677821 1.001105
equityclosebidaskspread
L1. 0.0001077 0.5336178 0 1.000 -1.045764 1.045979
L2.** 0.3572464 0.2912175 1.23 0.220 -0.2135295 0.9280223
us10yrspreadoverlibor
L1. 2.64932 7.394693 0.36 0.720 -11.84401 17.14265
L2. 2.903483 6.864865 0.42 0.672 -10.5514 16.35837
pdequitywithin
L1. 17.98913 40.67084 0.44 0.658 -61.72425 97.70252
lnequityvolumes
L1.** 0.8644093 1.199718 0.72 0.471 -1.486995 3.215814
pdefault
LD. 0.4757152 1.000497 0.48 0.634 -1.485224 2.436654
creditmarketsclevelandstress
L1.** -10.46409 4.079804 -2.56 0.010 -18.46036 -2.467822
Constant
61.10714 47.4397 1.29 0.198 -31.87296 154.0872
27,440 2400
112 11,482.61
245 0.000
N.B.	Coefficients	marked	**	are	significant	at	5%	using	one-step	standard	errors,	whereas	
those	marked	*	are	significant	at	10%	using	one-step	standard	errors.
Two-Step	estimation	with	Windmeijer's	robust	standard	errors
95%	Confidence	bounds
(N)T Instruments
N Wald	Chi	2(30)
T Prob	>	Chi	2
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 Table 9: Implied marginal effects 
 
 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
After	one	
day
-0.0087 -0.0034 -0.2197 -0.0875 0.1978 0.0756 -10.8820 -8.9315 11.0899 -0.3663
After	two	
days
0.2265 0.2131 5.6157 5.2815 -5.2006 -4.8914 70.9652 66.3112 -499.1675 -469.9147
After	three	
days
0.4742 0.4562 11.7614 11.3131 -10.8804 -10.4662 165.2142 158.2321 -1028.1902 -989.7097
Long	run 2.03084096 1.9338 50.3629 47.9564 -46.5992 -44.3747 694.8814 658.5372 -4415.8264 -4208.0902
After	one	
day
-0.0801 -0.0767 -2.2506 -2.1541 1.1732 1.1228 -39.3518 -37.7175 62.1417 59.4201
After	two	
days
-0.1090 -0.1079 -3.0702 -3.0395 1.5933 1.5778 -58.0642 -57.2273 79.9806 79.4589
After	three	
days
-0.0262 -0.0466 -0.7770 -1.3440 0.3723 0.6734 -33.6532 -40.1697 -0.4969 18.8750
Long	run -0.2510 -0.3261 -7.2197 -9.2979 3.6278 4.7348 -209.4070 -231.2180 108.3741 181.6458
After	one	
day
-0.2368 -0.2290 -5.6178 -5.4317 6.2471 6.0397 -44.1981 -42.7512 63.2306 61.1153
After	two	
days
-0.5139 -0.4917 -12.1990 -11.6727 13.5438 12.9595 -96.7483 -92.5743 136.3481 130.4649
After	three	
days
-0.7701 -0.7259 -18.2867 -17.2355 20.2898 19.1226 -145.4822 -137.1474 203.8274 192.0755
Long	run -3.6372 -3.4026 -86.3545 -80.7858 95.8327 89.6495 -686.3273 -642.1795 963.3653 901.1018
Twelve	
Month	
Libor
Three	
Month	
Libor
One	Month	
Libor
Model
Mean	Change
Largest	observed	
positive	change
Largest	observed	
negative	change
+25bps	change -25bps	change
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